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The decentralisation of production by various means has been a major feature of Australian labour law
and relations since the 1980s. Since the recession of the early 1980s, many businesses have pursued
financial savings through outsourcing of labour. Many companies did so firstly as a means of focusing on
their core business activities and shifting to program-based accounting systems. More recently it has
been part of the process of continuous cost-cutting and downsizing, associated with the preoccupation
with shareholder value. Decentralisation is usually accompanied by reduction of the internal workforce
and intensification of work remaining within the business. These trends are not surprising given the high
degree of foreign ownership and control of large business in Australia, and the exposure of the Australian
economy to diversification, deregulation and global competition in the last two decades. Decentralisation
was in fact championed by conservative governments which began outsourcing (“contracting out”) or
privatising government businesses and services from the late 1980s. This paper examines recent
Australian Law concerning productive decentralisation. The paper was prepared as a national report for
the XVIII World Congress of Labour and Social Security Law, Paris, 5-8 September 2006, on behalf of the
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Labour Law and Productive Decentralisation:
Australian Report*

1 - INTRODUCTION
The decentralisation of production by various means has been a major
feature of Australian labour law and relations since the 1980s. Since the
recession of the early 1980s, many businesses have pursued financial
savings through outsourcing of labour. Many companies did so firstly as a
means of focusing on their core business activities and shifting to programbased accounting systems. More recently it has been part of the process of
continuous cost-cutting and downsizing, associated with the preoccupation
with shareholder value. Decentralisation is usually accompanied by
reduction of the internal workforce and intensification of work remaining
within the business. These trends are not surprising given the high degree of
foreign ownership and control of large business in Australia, and the
exposure of the Australian economy to diversification, deregulation and
global competition in the last two decades. Decentralisation was in fact
championed by conservative governments which began outsourcing
(“contracting out”) or privatising government businesses and services from
the late 1980s.
The development has been aided by changes in technology and organisation;
often the influence of these two forces are closely intermingled. For example,
developments in telephony and computing have allowed the shift in
customer service and marketing to call centres, often contracted out of the
core business, but sometimes spun off to a subsidiary. Banks and telephone
companies now routinely use external call centres to replace functions
previously provided in-house.
In Australia the main means of decentralisation have been:
sub-contracting: replacement of in-house functions with services
provided by contractors, often “independent contractors” who are selfemployed. Because they are not classed as employees, they are not
covered by most aspects of labour law.

*

Prepared by Dr Andrew Frazer, Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong, and Mr Toby
Borgeest, Partner, Slater & Gordon Solicitors, Perth. The law stated is that obtaining
at September 2005.
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labour hire: outsourcing of functions to labour hire agencies which
provide workers (who may be either employees of the agency or
independent contractors), often on a long-term basis. This sector has
grown substantially in the last decade.
corporate restructuring and outsourcing, including the creation of
subsidiary corporations and “spin-off” businesses (which may be
formally autonomous though with large shareholdings by the former
owner).
The effect of productive decentralisation on individual labour relations has
been to reduce the scope of individual employment law, since in many cases
the workers involved are recategorised as contractors rather than employees.
As they work not under a contract of employment but under a “commercial”
contract, they are not covered by Australian labour law in either its
individual or its collective aspects.
The effect of productive decentralisation on collective labour relations has
been to limit the scope of collective bargaining though the making of
agreements. Although unions may be entitled to represent workers who have
been outsourced to other firms or are employed by agencies, they have often
found it more difficult to bargain since they now must deal with several
employers. More significantly, the trend towards productive decentralisation
has been accompanied by a culture of resistance by employers towards
collective bargaining, and a shift towards individualisation of employment
relations. These trends are linked by an increased concern by large corporate
businesses to increase control over their resources and environment, by
internalising employment relations within the firm and by controlling inputs
through contractual networks.
The Workplace Relations Act 1996, the legislation which governs collective
labour law at the federal level, has facilitated the shift towards
individualisation. Further changes to this legislation, titled WorkChoices,
was introduced in late 2005 and is expected to become law in early 2006.
This legislation is likely to promote individualisation and productive
decentralisation by deregulating and reconstituting labour relations in
favour of a focus on the corporate employer entity and its interests. The full
impact of these amendments on the topic of this report is as yet uncertain,
although the authors have attempted to indicate briefly the immediate effect
of the changes.1

1

This discussion is based on the federal government’s WorkChoices document released
in October 2005, and the Workplace Relations Amendment (WorkChoices) Bill as
presented to parliament in November 2005.

4
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2 – GROUPS OF COMPANIES AND UNITY OF ENTERPRISE
Australian law does not recognise related companies as forming a single
enterprise for the purposes of labour or social security law. The “unity of
enterprise” approach – which treats the members of a corporate group as
effectively a single entity, each company available to meet the liabilities of
other members of the group – has been discussed but is thought to be
debarred by high judicial authority confirming the conventional approach of
the separateness of corporate entities.2 Each company within a corporate
group is treated for the purposes of labour law as an entity completely
separate from the others, and no special obligations arise between related
companies for employment purposes. Even under corporate law it is still
only in exceptional circumstances that the courts are able or willing to “lift
the corporate veil” and consider shareholdings in or control of companies as
creating wider legal obligations. This may potentially occur in cases of fraud,
or where the two companies are really identical or where one company is
merely a cipher for another, in which case an implied agency arises; however
these exceptions are rarely applied.
The corporate veil was recently lifted in a labour law situation when a parent
company transferred its cleaning operations, along with the cleaning staff, to
a specially-created subsidiary company in order to evade its obligations
under a recently concluded collective agreement. The state industrial
tribunal imposed an award on the subsidiary company in the same terms as
the agreement. In so doing, it explicitly looked beyond the corporate veil on
the basis that the subsidiary was the agent of the parent company and in no
way independent. Another ground for making the award was that the
corporate restructuring had been undertaken for a purpose (amongst others)
of avoiding the parent company’s legal obligations.3 The tribunal’s approach
has been criticised as going beyond the proper application of the exception to

2

The “unity of enterprise” approach has been mooted in several United Kingdom
decisions but rejected in appellate courts: DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets
LBC [1976] 1 WLR 852; Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1990] Ch 433. The High Court of
Australia confirmed the sanctity of the corporate veil (the Salomon principle) in
Industrial Equity Ltd v Blackburn (1977) 137 CLR 567; see John H Farrar, ‘Legal Issues
involving Corporate Groups’, Company and Securities Law Journal 16 (1998) 184-206;
Joellen Riley, ‘Australia’ in Takashi Araki and Shinya Ouchi, eds, Corporate
Restructuring and the Role of Labour Law, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2003
(Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations, 47), p. 17. Under the Workplace Relations
Act 1996 (Cth) s.70LB(2), related corporations may be treated as a single business for
the purpose of certifying collective agreements.

3

Australian Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers Union, Western Australian
Branch v Burswood Catering and Entertainment Pty Ltd 2002 WAIRC 04778 (a decision
of the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission in Court Session, an
appellate tribunal equivalent in status to a high level court). A further appeal to the
Western Australian Industrial Appeal Court was rejected: Burswood Catering and
Entertainment Pty Ltd v AHLMWU (WA Branch) [2002] WASCA 354.
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separate corporate personality.4 In most cases, such an approach is
unnecessary because successors in a business are bound by the former
owner’s awards and agreements (see section 3 below).
There are few restrictions on the use of multiple corporate entities for
businesses in Australia. A study in 1998 showed that 90 percent of the 500
largest companies had subsidiaries, the vast majority of which were wholly
owned. It is common for large businesses to use a pyramid structure
comprising several levels of controlled corporate entities within a group.5
Australian businesses often make use of multiple corporate entities to
separate the employment of workers from the holding of group assets. The
doctrine of separate legal personality means that in such situations
corporate groups may be able to avoid liability for employment obligations.
In the event of insolvency or labour shedding, the employees may find that
their direct employer has insufficient assets to meet their entitlements,
especially accrued leave, severance or redundancy payments and
superannuation (retirement benefits). Other companies within the group will
not be responsible for these liabilities. The separation of employees from
group assets seems to be an increasing phenomenon; one academic writer
has said that such arrangements are being required by lenders in order to
increase their security over the assets of the corporate borrowers, at the
expense of the interests of employees.6 Even where there is no fraudulent or
evasive intention, the existence of multiple personalities may make it unclear
which one is the employer, resulting in increased cost, delay and uncertainty
for employees pursuing their claims in insolvency cases.7
The problems arising from separation of the employing and asset-holding
entities are "endemic to the holding company / subsidiary companies

4

Jason Harris, ‘Lifting the Corporate Veil on the Basis of an Implied Agency: A
Reevaluation of Smith, Stone and Knight’, Company and Securities Law Journal 23
(2005), pp. 21-25.

5

Ian Ramsay and Geoff Stapledon, Corporate Groups in Australia, Centre for Corporate
Law and Securities Regulation, University of Melbourne, 1998, pp. 4, 7
<http://cclsr.law.unimelb.edu.au/go/centre-activities/research/research-reportsand-research-papers/>. Australian corporations law uses the term "subsidiary", which
covers ownership of a majority of shares or control over appointment of the board of
directors; while the Australian Stock Exchange use the term "controlled entity" which
includes directly owned subsidiaries and indirectly controlled related companies (ie
companies owned or partly owned and effectively controlled by a subsidiary).

6

Michael Gronow. “Insolvent Corporate Groups and their Employees; The Case for
Further Reform”, (2003) 21 Company and Securities Law Journal, p. 196-7.

7

One example is Romero v Auty [2000] VSC 462, involving a small carpentry business
employing 13 workers. The uncertainty caused by multiple entities was decided by an
appeal against the decision of the company liquidators.
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structure which is a feature of Australia’s corporate sector."8 It may be
difficult in such cases to distinguish an avoidance strategy from a genuine
business failure. Indeed, the term “strategic insolvency” is often used for
situations when corporate insolvency law is viewed by management as the
best means of achieving their business goals.9
One deliberate strategy involves a "phoenix" company: the business owner
sets up a new corporate entity, and transfers the assets of the business to
the new entity, often in return for worthless securities (or loans, share buybacks and other capital transfers). The old corporate entity has thus become
a "shell" with no real assets, but remains the employer of the business’s
workers. The shell company is allowed to fail, and the business becomes
reborn, though without the debts and obligations which it had to its former
employees and other creditors.
In recent years there have been many cases where, following a business
collapse, former employees have been left to recover their unpaid
entitlements from company receivers and liquidators along with other
creditors. Such business failures have often raised allegations that assets
had been transferred to related entities before the collapse, reducing the pool
of assets available to creditors, including employees.10 As employees are not
secured creditors, they usually fail to obtain more than a token part of the
amounts owed to them.11 As employers are not required to give financial
information to employees, employees may be unaware of the state of their
employer’s business until it has collapsed.12 Employers are not required to
make provision for payment of employee entitlements on insolvency; in fact,
corporate directors and managers would be regarded as imprudent and
possibly in breach of their duties if they did.13

8

Graeme Dean, Frank Clarke and Erne Houghton, "Corporate Restructuring, Creditors’
rights, cross-guarantees and group behaviour", (1999) 17 Company and Securities
Law Journal, p. 86.

9

David Noakes, “Measuring the Impact of Strategic Insolvency on Employees”, (2003) 11
Insolvency Law Journal 91-116. Noakes concluded on the basis of a questionnaire to
insolvency practitioners that clear cases were comparatively uncommon.

10

Justice Simon Whelan and Leon Zwier, Employee Entitlements and Corporate
Insolvency and Reconstruction, Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation,
University of Melbourne, 2005, p. 11 <http://cclsr.law.unimelb.edu.au/go/centreactivities/research/research-reports-and-research-papers/>; Gronow, op cit, p. 196.

11

Riley, “Australia”, op cit, p. 31.

12

In the case of the failure of the airline Ansett (which did not involve “strategic
insolvency”), employees and unions were unaware that the company had sold and
leased back its aircraft, leaving it with few tangible assets to meet the claims of
employees.

13

Directors owe employees, along with other creditors, a “duty of imperfect obligation” on
impending insolvency; however this cannot be enforced directly: Spies v R (2000) 201
CLR 603 at 636.
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Australian corporations law has attempted to deal with the problems arising
from corporate groups by creating stronger reporting requirements and more
stringent directors’ duties (together with tightened restrictions on insolvent
trading), rather than by lifting the corporate veil. Recent changes to
corporations legislation provide that persons who engage in transactions
with the purpose of avoiding the company’s obligations to pay employee
entitlements, they may be personally liable for any loss suffered by the
employee.14 This would include company directors as well as other
companies involved in the transaction. After a series of contentious
corporate collapses in the late 1990s which left employees with little
recourse to recover their entitlements, in 2001 the federal government
introduced a scheme (partly underwritten by the government) for payment of
part of the amounts owed to employees.15 These changes have been of only
limited effectiveness in dealing with the problem; and attempts to pursue
persons involved in schemes through other legal means have also been
largely ineffective, resulting in proposals for more radical solutions such as
insurance or trust funds, and the pooling of group assets to meet
liabilities.16
The most notorious instance of corporate group restructuring with labour
law implications was the Waterfront Case in 1998. The controllers of the
Patrick group (a major stevedoring business and component of the Lang
group with widespread transport and infrastructure interests) were wellknown as wanting to eliminate many of the labour practices which were
associated with the wharf labourers’ union, the Maritime Workers Union of
Australia (MUA). These conditions were regarded by both Patrick and the
federal government as restrictive and entrenching low productivity. In the
course of 1997 the Patrick group was restructured in a complex series of
transactions, which resulted in the assets of the business being moved from
four employer companies (which continued to perform the loading and
unloading ships) to separate companies within the group.17
The 1,400 employees and the MUA were unaware of these changes. As a
consequence, the employer companies became empty shells, with their only
significant assets being their contracts (labour supply agreements) to provide
stevedoring services to the group’s "operations" company. These contracts

14

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s. 596AB.

15

The General Employee Entitlements and Redundancy Scheme (GEERS) is
discretionary and does not obligate the government to provide funds. It replaced a
specific scheme which was introduced in response to the collapse of Ansett Airlines,
which made redundant 16,000 employees who were together owed $A686 million.

16

Gronow, op cit.

17

Graeme Orr, "Conspiracy on the Waterfront", (1998) 11 Australian Journal of Labour
Law 159-185; David Noakes, "Dogs on the Wharves: Corporate Groups and the
Waterfront Dispute", (1999) 11 Australian Journal of Corporate Law, p. 5.

8
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were terminated by the operations company using the pretext of a strike by
MUA members, making the employer companies insolvent and in the hands
of an administrator — who had no option but to dismiss the employees. The
stevedoring contracts were placed with other companies within the Lang
group, which were apparently set up with the intention of taking over this
business using non-union labour.
It was fortuitous that the MUA was able to obtain a court injunction
preventing the Patrick group from disposing of assets, and ordering the
reinstatement of the employees on an interim basis. The union claimed that
the companies engaged in the restructuring and the termination of the
labour supply agreements unlawfully, both by tortious conspiracy to
interfere with the employment contracts of the workers, and by
discriminating against unionists in violation of the freedom of association
provisions of the Workplace Relations Act. The union also claimed that the
federal government was a party to this conduct. The interim case was
appealed, finally reaching the country’s ultimate court, the High Court of
Australia, which upheld the injunctions. However there was a qualification
that the injunctions could not interfere with the responsibilities of the
administrator (who had taken over the employer companies once they
became insolvent).18 A final judicial decision on these claims was not made
because Patrick and the MUA reached an agreement on the reinstatement of
half of the workers on condition that further legal action be dropped. The
other workers were given voluntary redundancy payments.
If it had gone ahead unchallenged, the use of multiple corporate entities
combined with "strategic insolvency" (placing the subsidiary employer
companies in voluntary administration) would have effectively allowed the
Patrick group to retrench its workforce without liability for unfair dismissal,
accrued entitlements and redundancy payments. (It was originally proposed
that workers would be paid a proportion of their entitlements out of a fund
provided by the federal government). The waterfront scenario has been
repeated in several similar instances, with employers apparently copying the
Patrick strategy.19
The case illustrates what corporate lawyers describe as the capital boundary
problem: that entrepreneurs are able, through the corporate group
structure, to move capital between corporate entities at will without regard
to the interests of non-shareholders, particularly employees. The lack of
transparency of such transactions is aided by consolidated group

18

Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia [1998] HCA 30;
(1998) 195 CLR 1.

19

Noakes, op cit, pp. 18-20.
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accounting, which does not require details to be revealed of the financial
relationships between individual companies within the group.
In recent years Australian trade unions have become more involved in
pursuing workers’ interests following business collapses, in political
campaigns, through participation in insolvency proceedings, and by
pursuing former directors.20

3 - TRANSFER OF UNDERTAKING AND OTHER MODIFICATIONS IN
THE LEGAL SITUATION OF AN UNDERTAKING OR PARTS
THEREOF
(a) Definition of “transfer of undertaking or parts thereof”; and
applicability to the externalization of certain operations of an
undertaking
For constitutional reasons, awards made under the national or federal
system of industrial relations regulation are binding only on named parties;
although it has been common for awards to name a large number of
employers, it follows that a transfer of undertaking did not necessarily bind
the transferee unless they were specifically bound by the award as a party.
(By contrast, awards made under the State systems could bind all parties in
the industry as a “common rule” award.) The legislation governing the
federal system has, since 1914, made awards binding on “any successor,
assignee or transmittee (whether immediate or not) to or of the business or
part of the business of an employer who was a party to the industrial
dispute, including a corporation that has acquired or taken over the
business or part of the business of the employer".21. Similar provisions apply
to collective agreements registered under the federal law, as well as to
statutory individual agreements.22
The statutory provisions were first established at a time prior to the
prominence now given to registered collective agreements and statutory
individual agreements under federal law. Awards, made by the federal
industrial tribunal through a process of conciliation and arbitration as an
instrument of settlement of industrial disputes, were the primary form of
industrial regulation. In that context, the transmission of business
provisions in federal law were created to make the power to settle industrial

20

Louise Willans Floyd, “Insolvency, Trade Unions – and the Third Way?”, (2005) 13
Insolvency Law Journal 153-162.

21

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), s. 149(1)(d).

22

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), ss. 170MB(1)(c); 170VS(1).
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disputes effective by extending the instrument of settlement to "the ever
changing body of persons within the area of such disturbances".23
These provisions have created practical difficulties of interpretation. The
concepts of “business” and “part of the business” are not defined in the
statute. However, few problems arise with the application of the provisions in
the situation of the outright sale of a business. If company A disposes of the
whole of its operations, assets, goodwill and other aspects of its enterprise,
and the whole of that enterprise is embraced by company B, then employees
who follow that enterprise to company B are unlikely to encounter difficulty
in establishing that company B is a “successor, assignee or transmittee” of
the business of company A. The federal statute operates to impose upon
company B the obligations of a party to the industrial instruments which
previously bound company A in respect of its employees in the business.
For most of the 20th century, few disputes over the application of these
provisions gave rise to litigation requiring courts to interpret their meaning.
From the late 1990s there have been several significant cases in the courts
where the application of those provisions has had to be considered closely.
This has come about largely because of the complexity and increasing
prevalence of arrangements such as contracting out and outsourcing, and
the difficulties in application of concepts such as “part of a business” to
such arrangements.24 The High Court of Australia recently posed the
fundamental question in this way:
Plainly, the purpose of the section and its predecessor succession provisions is, and
always has been, to extend the operation of awards beyond those who were parties
to the dispute that the award determined. But identifying that purpose does not
answer the question that arises in this matter — how far does the extension go?25

Parliament has left to the Courts the task of determining what
circumstances amount to a succession, assignation or transmission in the
relevant sense, and what counts as “the business” or “part” of the business
sufficient to enliven the operation of these statutory provisions.
In its decision in the PP Consultants case, the High Court recently expressed
some reluctance to formulate a general test to ascertain whether a
commercial enterprise had succeeded to the business of another commercial
enterprise. The Court stated that was because the question of succession is
a mixed question of fact and law and because the concept of “business” is
“chameleon like”. In its decision, the High Court held that when considering

23

George Hudson v Australian Timber Workers’ Union (1933) 32 CLR 413 at 455 per
Starke J.

24

See Trent Sebbens, “Wake, O wake - Transmission of Business Provisions in
Outsourcing and Privatisation”, (2003) 16 Australian Jounal of Labour Law 133-171.

25

Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations v Gribbles Radiology Pty Ltd [2005]
HCA 9 at [21] per Gleeson CJ, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ.
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whether a part of a business has been transmitted in the relevant sense, it is
necessary to identify or characterise the business or the relevant part of the
business of the first employer, identify the character of the transferred
business activities in the hands of the new employer and then compare the
two. “If in substance, they bear the same character then it will usually be the
case that the new employer has succeeded to the business or part of the
business of the previous employer.”26
In the most recent “transmission of business” case before the High Court,
Gribbles Radiology, the Court identified two key questions which must be
considered in relation to the transmission of business provisions of the
federal law. First, there must be an identification of exactly what is meant, in
the context of the particular case, by “the business or part of the business of
the former employer”. Second, there must be an identification of what part of
the business the former employer once had which is now enjoyed by the
person allegedly bound by the relevant industrial instrument.27
The consequence of this approach is that when a part of a business is
outsourced, the new operator will not be bound the awards or agreements
covering the former operator if the business of the new operator, considered
as a whole, is substantially different from that of the former operator. In PP
Consultants, a pharmacy shop took over the business of the local bank
branch which had recently been closed. Two former employees of the bank
were employed by the pharmacy to do the bank agency work (which they had
previously done for the bank). Although the workers continued to do the
same work, the High Court held that they were not entitled to the conditions
under the bank’s certified agreement as the business of the pharmacy was
not substantially of the same character as that of the bank. While the
pharmacy had taken over banking functions for the bank, it was not
engaged in the business of banking: it was simply acting as an agent on
behalf of the bank rather than operating as a bank itself.
In the dispute which led to the Gribbles Radiology litigation, a number of
radiographers were employed to work at a particular radiography clinic over
a period of time. During that time their duties and arrangement of their work
did not materially change, but they were employed by a succession of
different employers. What was distinctive about these circumstances was
that the operator of the premises was not the employer at any stage, but it
was a licensor to each of the employers in turn. When employer A held a
licence to operate radiography services at the premises, the employer
engaged the radiographers in question, and it was bound by various

26

PP Consultants Pty Ltd v Finance Sector Union of Australia (2000) 201 CLR 648 at 655.

27

Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations v Gribbles Radiology Pty Ltd (2005)
214 ALR 24.
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industrial instruments. When that license was terminated, the operator of
the premises entered into a new licence arrangement with Gribbles, and
Gribbles then engaged the radiographers as its employees. The question
which arose in the case was whether Gribbles was then bound by the
industrial instruments which employer A had been a party to. The Court
held that the mere entry into a license arrangement with a third party, an
arrangement relevantly identical to that of employer A’s earlier arrangement
with the third party, is not sufficient to constitute a “business or part
thereof” for the purposes of the transmission provisions of the Act. The Court
held that, to satisfy the requirements of the provisions, it will usually be
necessary to identify a particular activity that is pursued, and some tangible
or intangible assets that are used in that pursuit. This approach is
significantly narrower than an alternative approach which may focus
particularly on the identity of the employees or continuity of their work
function alone.
In legislative amendments made as a part of the WorkChoices Bill in
November 2005, the transmission of business provision as they have
previously been understood have been effectively abolished. They remain in
only a very limited form and as a kind of a kind of transition arrangement.
The test for establishing whether a transmission of business event has
occurred remains substantially the same under the new legislative
provisions. A business of part of a business will be treated as a “business
being transferred” for the purposes of the new legislation in circumstances
where the new employer is the “successor, transmittee or assignee” of the
business of the old employer. However, the continuing operation of the old
transmitted industrial instrument obligations is significantly truncated.
First, unlike the old provisions, the transmitted obligations will simply cease
to operate at all after an initial period of 12 months following the
transmission of the business. Further, the transmitted obligations will only
apply in respect of employees in the new business who were employed in the
business as at the date of transmission. Accordingly, any new employees
engaged by the transmitted business within that initial 12 month period will
note enjoy the benefits of the transmitted obligations. This is in contrast to
the old arrangements where the business was continuing to be bound by the
obligations in respect of all of its employees, regardless of when they were
employed.
Further, there is provision for the new employer to apply to the federal
tribunal for an order that would have the effect of releasing the new
employer from the obligations transmitted at the times of the transmission of
the business. The discretion of the tribunal to grant such an application is
unfettered.
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The effect of all of these limitations is that a transmission of business event
will relieve employers of obligations to comply with industrial instruments
(both awards and agreements) following a short transitional period. This has
particular significance with respect to awards which (unlike collective
agreements) generally operate indefinitely into the future, as a settlement or
part settlement of an industrial dispute.

(b) Rules for the protection of workers’ rights in situations
involving the transfer of an undertaking or parts thereof
The effect of the “transmission of business” provisions referred to is that
employees who continue to work in the business (by taking up work with the
new employer), enjoy the same pay and conditions provided by the award or
agreement. There is no requirement that all employees in the business must
continue to be employed by the new operator of the business (although this
is common), and employees who are not taken up may be entitled to
redundancy pay. Given the complexity of the legislation, however, it can be
difficult to identify in advance whether an award or agreement will be
binding on the new operator of only part of a transmitted business.
Where a function is outsourced, but there is no transfer of the business or
part of the business the federal legislation provides some protection by
prohibiting conduct which adversely affects the employees in the first
business for the reason or for reasons including the fact that those
employees are protected by relevant industrial instruments. In AMASCU v
Greater Dandenong City Council,28 a union representing workers employed to
provide home and community care services brought an application alleging
that the municipal Council had breached the freedom of association
provisions of the federal law during an outsourcing operation. The Council
had sought tenders to operate its home and community care services. The
Council’s own employees submitted their own tender to perform the work,
but the tender was granted to an external service provider which had
submitted a lower rate for the performance of the work. The Council’s
employees had based their tender on their pre-existing award entitlements.
The external service provider was not bound by those same instruments and
was able to construct a proposal based on significantly lower rates of pay.
The Court found that the Council was in breach of the federal law’s
prohibition on injuring its employees in their employment for the prohibited
reasons that those employees were entitled to the benefits of an industrial
instrument.29

28

(2001) 49 AILR 4-437.

29

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), s. 298K.
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(c) Consultation with employee representatives at the time of a
transfer of an undertaking or parts thereof
There is no national statutory requirement for consultation with or notice to
employees representatives at the time of a transfer of an undertaking or
parts thereof. There are provisions under the federal law enabling the federal
industrial tribunal to make whatever orders it thinks appropriate in the
public interest to remedy any failure by an employer to inform and consult
relevant trade unions about the termination of employment of 15 or more
employees for reasons of an economic, technological structure or similar
nature.30 Although that provision does not specifically deal with outsourcing
and/or transmission of business, it is the one statutory source of an
obligation to discuss and consult with trade unions in a transmission of
business circumstance.
In the absence of direct statutory requirement that employers consult with
unions and their members in circumstances where outsourcing all
transmission of business is contemplated, many unions have sought to
regulate these matters by inclusion of particular provisions in collective
industrial agreements through collective bargaining. For example, such
provision may impose a duty on the employer to consult with the union
parties to the agreement in the event that the employer party is considering,
and before it has decided upon, proposals for the implementation for
significant change. Such change may be defined broadly to include any
proposal to transmit the business or part thereof or to outsource any
particular function.

(d) - (e) Regulation of relations when the transferee continues to
operate in the transferor’s premises
This is not a topic which is regulated at all, in any direct sense, by federal
statute. It is not a topic that is commonly regulated by the express terms of
any award or certified agreement. No particular significance is given to the
location at which the work is performed by the transferred employees
subsequent to the transfer.

30

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), s. 170GA.
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4 - THE LEGAL SITUATION OF EMPLOYEES OF CONTRACTORS AND
OTHER AFFILIATED ENTERPRISES VIS-À-VIS THE
PRINCIPAL/PARENT ENTERPRISE
(a) liability of principal companies for contractors
A principal company is not generally liable for the acts of contractors. There
are certain exceptions which have been created by legislation in the fields of
occupational health and safety, and the payment of wages.
i. liability for health and safety
Occupational health and safety (OHS) legislation of the Australian States
imposes criminal liability (punishable by large fines), while workers
compensation legislation and the common law provide civil liability (with
monetary compensation for loss). The workers compensation legislation
applies only to employees and allows them to recover compensation from
their employer’s insurer for amounts set by the legislation. OHS legislation
establishes a high-level duty of care which is absolute and not dependent on
proof of negligence; in some cases the duty is qualified as imposing a duty to
eliminate risks as far as is reasonably practicable — although this is still
considered to impose very significant responsibilities to avoid risks.31 The
duty imposed is personal, which means that if a principal is liable for an
injury to a contractor’s employee, this is not because they are vicariously
liable for the contractor’s own omission but because the law also imposes a
separate duty on the principal. Thus a number of persons may be liable for
breaches of their own separate duties in relation to a single event.
The OHS statutes create liability for principal corporations in relation to
employees of contractors in several ways. The main duty under the
legislation is the duty of the employer. The employer’s duty is two-fold and
extends to both employees and other persons. In one case in the State of
Victoria it was recognised that the OHS legislation could accommodate
modes of working such as sub-contracting, and it was held that the
employer’s duty to employees encompasses the employees of sub-contractors
over whom the principal retains some control.32 Usually the employer’s duty
is limited to the employer’s place of work, although in some States the reach

31

Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic) s. 20. The NSW and Queensland
statutes are not qualified in this way.

32

R v ACR Roofing Pty Ltd [2004] VSCA 215 (Victorian Supreme Court, Court of Appeal).
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is very wide, covering risks wherever they arise.33 A similar duty is imposed
on self-employed persons and contractors in relation to others.
In some states there is a separate duty of persons conducting a business,
which is expressly owed to all persons who do work for the business whether
or not they are an employee or contractor of the business.34
Generally the legislation also imposes a duty of care on occupiers or
controllers of workplaces for risks arising from their operation. Under the
most stringent statutory provision (in New South Wales), the controller of
any premises, plant or substance owes a duty to all persons who use it for
work. The duty extends beyond contractors and their employees to include
other entrants under contract or license, as well as members of the public.35
As this duty extends to persons who have even only limited control over the
premises, it has been held to apply to franchisors in relation to premises and
plant operated by the franchisee: because the franchisor was able to
determine operational aspects of the franchisee’s business under the
franchise contract. The franchisor was made criminally liable when the
employee of a franchise was killed by an electrical fault which arose from the
operation of equipment according to standard operational procedures
determined by the franchisor.36
ii. liability for wages and conditions of employment
Generally a principal is not liable for the contractor’s failure to provide
appropriate wages or conditions. In exceptional situations the principal
might be regarded as the agent of the contractor. There is also legislation
which is designed to cover specific situations involving sub-contracting and
similar triangular relationships.
In New South Wales (the largest State) there is a statutory provision which
has been designed to apply particularly to sub-contracting in the building
industry. It makes a principal contractor liable for wage payments to the
sub-contractor’s employees during the period of work for the principal. The
duty is discharged when the sub-contractor gives the principal contractor a
statement indicating that all outstanding wage payments have been made. It
is a criminal offence for a sub-contractor to make a false statement. The
principal may deduct wage payments which have been made to the sub-

33

Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic) ss. 21(3), 23; Workplace Health and
Safety Act 1995 (Qld), s.28(3) states that "An employer has an obligation to ensure
other persons are not exposed to risks to their health and safety arising out of the
conduct of the employer’s business or undertaking."

34

Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Qld), s.29A..

35

Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW) s. 10.

36

WorkCover Authority of NSW v McDonald’s Australia Ltd (1999) 95 IR 383.
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contractor’s employees from contract payments owed to the subcontractor.37 Although this provision attempts to impose some personal
responsibility on both principal and sub-contractor, it is of limited
usefulness in situations of sudden bankruptcy, and does not displace
normal bankruptcy or insolvency law. The provision does not apply when the
sub-contractor becomes bankrupt or goes into receivership and the
principal’s contract payments are payable to the receiver or liquidator.
There is a simpler provision under the legislation of Queensland: the
employee of a sub-contractor can recover unpaid wages from the principal
contractor as if directly employed. The principal contractor may then recover
the amount paid from the sub-contractor and has priority for satisfaction of
this claim in bankruptcy proceedings (although it is unclear whether this
priority is effective to displace insolvency law).38
In New South Wales, Queensland and South Australia there are also specific
statutory provisions covering payment of outworkers in the clothing trades,
where it is often uncertain who is the actual employer. In such cases the
outworker may make a claim for unpaid remuneration against a person who
is their apparent employer. The apparent employer is liable to pay the claim
but may also refer the claim to a person who is the actual employer. This
allows a court to determine who is liable as the employer, and in the
meantime the outworker is at least paid by the apparent employer.39

(b) Is it mandatory for contractor to inform employees of identity
of principal?
Australian law does not require a contracting employer to inform their
employees about the identity of the principal for whom they are working
indirectly.

37

Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW), s. 127.

38

Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld), ss. 388, 389). Section 388 states: "If an employer
has let the performance of work to a subcontractor, an employee employed by the
subcontractor in that work has the same rights and remedies for a claim for wages
against the employer under this division as an employee of the employer has against a
prime contractor."

39

Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW), ss. 127B-127D; Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld),
ss. 400B-400F; Fair Work Act 1994 (SA), ss.99D-99H.
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(c) Judicial decisions on the existence of a direct employment
relationship between a principal company and employees of
contractors or subsidiary companies
Because of the contractual basis of the employment relationship at common
law in Australia, it is not possible for a direct employment relationship to
arise between the principal company and the employees of a contractor or
subsidiary unless there is a contract between the principal and the
employees. Nonetheless, an employment relationship may exist between a
principal or holding company and a (supposed) employee of its subsidiary or
contractor in several situations:
(a)

an ineffective transfer of the employee from principal to contractor or
subsidiary – the principal remains the “true employer” of the worker;

(b)

joint employment: both principal and contractor are employers.
(a) Ineffective transfer; Principal is the “true employer”

When faced with a contest as to which of two parties is liable as an
employer, the courts attempt to ascertain who is the “true employer.” The
issue has traditionally arisen in the case of the “hired worker”, as when large
equipment is hired out along with a skilled operator. More recently the issue
has arisen with “triangular relationships”, particularly in relation to agency
workers on a long-term placement with a single client. The question of which
person is the employer has traditionally been answered by determining
which one is ultimately entitled to control the worker’s performance of the
job in a detailed manner.40 Usually it is the original (“general”) employer the agency / contractor rather than the principal / client - who is considered
to be the employer, although in rare cases it has been held that sufficient
control was exercised by the client to make them the employer.41
The “true employer” approach, as it may be called, sometimes looks beyond
the corporate veil. It reflects the modern test for an employment relationship,
which relies on all relevant factors, particularly control and the “economic
reality” of the relationship.42 In the case of related companies within a
corporate group, the true employer is not necessarily the company which
pays the worker; rather it is the company (or person) which stands in the
position of employer and exercises authority as such. All the circumstances

40

Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v Coggins and Griffith Ltd [1947] AC 1;

41

eg Drake Personnnel Ltd v Commissioner for State Revenue (Vic) (1998) 40 ATR 304
(taxation).

42

Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16; Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd
(2001) 207 CLR 21.
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of the relationship are relevant, in particular the beliefs of the employees as
to the identity of their employer.43 Courts and tribunals may find that the
holding company is the true or real employer of the worker, on the basis that
it was the holding company rather than its subsidiary which actually paid
and controlled the worker.
In the case of outsourcing (where the employee was originally directly
employed by the principal, and the principal supposedly transferred the
employee to a subsidiary or contractor), the true employer test may mean
that a purported transfer of the employee from the controlling corporation to
its subsidiary was ineffective and the true nature of the employment
relationship remained unchanged.44 It is a fundamental principle of common
law that an employee cannot be transferred without their consent; in order
to transfer the employment relationship, a new contract must be created
between the employee and the new employer. If this does not occur, the
employee remains employed by the principal. In some cases, the courts have
held that a purported transfer of employment was ineffective as no new
contract was created.
The absence of a new contractual relationship may be indicated by the fact
that there was no real change in the relationship: the principal might retain
complete and effective control over the employee, and the contracting or
subsidiary company might be regarded as merely an agent of the principal,
simply acting as a conduit for the payment of wages. This is what happened
in a recent case, Damevski v Giudice,45 where an employer purported to
“contract out” its cleaning operations by making its employee cleaners into
independent contractors engaged by a new intermediary company. The court
held that there was no real change in the employment relationship. A
significant factor was that the employee was given no choice: he was simply
told that in future he would be working for a new entity, but no other
aspects of his job changed. The court held that a reasonable bystander
would conclude that the original contractual relationship remained and that
the intermediary corporation was really only engaged to provide payment
services.
In McCluskey v Karagiozis46 the controllers of the Coogi group of companies
(which designed, manufactured and retailed clothing), undertook a
restructure of the group, transferring the 240 employees to several different

43

Australian Insurance Employees Union v W P Insurance Services Pty Ltd (1982) 42 IR
598; Pitcher v Langford (1991) 37 IR 338; Textile Footwear & Clothing Union of Australia
v Bellechic Pty Ltd [1998] 1465 FCA.

44

Damevski v Giudice [2003] FCAFC 252; (2003) 202 ALR 494.

45

[2003] FCAFC 252.

46

[2002] FCA 1137.
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operational companies within the group. The workers were not informed of
this. The companies then went into liquidation and it emerged that the new
employing companies did not have sufficient assets to cover accrued leave
and other entitlements. The judge held that the employees were creditors of
the pre-restructure companies which had employed them, as the purported
transfer was ineffective because it had occurred without their assent.
Following English authority that employees have the right to choose their
employer and cannot be transferred without their knowledge and consent,47
Merkel J said that:
the controllers appear to have pursued their own interests in disregard of the
entitlements and interests of their long serving and loyal employees by transferring
the employment of the employees, and the responsibility for their employee
entitlements, to shell companies thereby treating those employees as if they were
serfs, rather than free citizens entitled to choose their own employer.48

An alternative approach in this vein may be reached through the unfair
contracts jurisdiction of some State industrial courts. The special feature of
this jurisdiction is that the industrial court or tribunal may, taking into
account all the circumstances of the case and acting according to “equity
and good conscience”, vary the employment contract itself to reflect the true
situation and defeat a sham arrangement. Special remedies may then be
available to allow the employee to pursue all persons involved in the
arrangement. In one case the transfer of employees from one corporation to
a “spin-off” subsidiary corporation (which had no assets) was made
ineffective by turning the subsidiary into the agent of the principal
company.49 However the WorkChoices Bill would remove all recourse under
unfair contracts legislation for employees.
(b) Joint employment
The doctrine of joint employment has been derived from US law. (In that
country, the doctrine originated when courts began treating corporations
engaged in a joint venture as joint employers of the workers hired to carry
out the venture; but subsequently courts expanded the doctrine to cover a
range of situations where control of the worker is shared, such as agency
situations). The doctrine of joint employment has been discussed by judges
of Australian tribunals; however the doctrine has been directly applied in
only a few decisions and has not received authoritative acceptance.50 It has

47

Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014.

48

[2002] FCA 1137 at [16].

49

AOS Group Australia Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Arrogante [2004] NSWIRComm 80; see
Raper, op cit, p. 6.

50

Rohen Cullen, "A Servant and Two Masters? - The Doctrine of Joint Employment in
Australia", (2003) 16 Australian Journal of Labour Law 358; Elizabeth Raper, "To what
extent has the use of the concept of joint-employment assisted other recent law
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been raised in response to attempts by corporations to avoid obligations as
employers by the use of outsourcing, or corporate devices such as related or
subsidiary “shell” companies.
In several decisions, industrial tribunals at state and federal level have
indicated a willingness to apply such a doctrine, in effect to pierce the
corporate veil. The effect would be to hold a controlling company jointly
liable for the employment liabilities of its subsidiary. The doctrine seems to
be most applicable to labour hire situations involving related corporations,
for example where workers are outsourced to a subsidiary. In such a
situation, essentially the same result would be reached by finding that the
employer-subsidiary company was acting as agent for its parent corporation.
Where the corporations are unrelated, an Australian court or tribunal would
be more likely to find one or the other corporation to be the sole and true
employer.51
The concept has also been thought to be relevant where a worker was
provided by a nominee service company to a business operation, and the
service company was owned and controlled by the proprietor of the business.
Both the service company and the business operation were considered to be
the joint employers of the worker. However the doctrine of joint employment
was considered unnecessary for the decision, as the statutory successorship
provisions applied (see section 3 above).52
The concept has also been thought applicable in more “modern” employment
situations where there is no single employer. In one decision, a supposed
transfer of the manager of a group of businesses to a shell company was
held to be ineffective: although there was a change in the company which
paid his salary, his true employer remained the same. As an alternative, at
least one judge of the tribunal was prepared to hold that the manager was
employed by all the companies as a group. The presiding judge thought that
the case warranted the piercing of the corporate veil by use of the joint
employment doctrine, as the arrangement was a mere facade or sham;
however he found that this was unnecessary as the situation was adequately
resolved by the “true employer” test.53

reforms in curtailing the use of strategic insolvency as a device to avoid hte payment of
employee entitlements?", paper presented to 2nd Australian Labour Law Association
Conference, Sydney, September 2004.
51

Costello v Allstaff Industrial Personnel (SA) Pty Ltd [2004] SAIRComm 13; (2005) AILR
350-031

52

Morgan v Kittochide Nominees Pty Ltd (2002) 117 IR 152; Workplace Relations Act 1996,
s.149(d).
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Matthews v Cool or Cosy Pty Ltd; Ceil Comfort Home Insulation Pty Ltd, 3003 WAIRC
10388 (Full Bench, WA Industrial Relations Commission), per Sharkey P at [312],
[321-323].
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5 - LEASE OF WORKERS AND OTHER FORMS OF SUPPLY OF
WORKERS
(a) Can two or more legally distinct enterprises lease workers
between them?
Australian law contains no general prohibition which restricts an employer
from supplying the services of its employees to a third party. As a general
proposition, it is a matter wholly for the contracting parties — that is, for the
employer of the labour, and the purchaser of the services of that labour — to
determine between themselves the authority over the performance of work by
the workers, the assignment of tasks, wages and other conditions of
employment. In general, the purchaser of the services (the “host” employer)
would determine the duties and tasks to be performed, and the enterprise
which formally employs and supplies those workers would set the price for
the services, and determine the rate at which the workers would be paid.54
In fact the supply of workers on a lease-type contract basis, known generally
as labour hire, is a rapidly growing form of work arrangement in Australia.
Labour hire employees currently comprise approximately 3 percent of the
Australian employee workforce.55 The use of labour hire continues to be
mainly for the provision of specialised or additional workers, usually on a
short-term basis; however many large businesses systematically use workers
supplied by an agency as a means of outsourcing some of their functions.
Such arrangements also have the advantage of externalising risks associated
with the use of labour (notably compensation for injuries). The growth of
labour hire has prompted several recent public inquiries, and is generally
opposed by the trade union movement. The federal government has
announced its intention to introduce legislation which will protect the use of
labour hire (both independent contractors and agency-employed employees).

54

Some research indicates that 70% of labour hire workers in Australia are engaged as
direct employees of the labour hire agency. Linda Brennan, Michael Valos and Kevin
Hindle, On-hired Workers in Australia: Motivations and Outcomes, Occasional Research
Report, Melbourne, School of Applied Communication, RMIT University, 2003, pp 5051.

55

Australia, Productivity Commission, The Growth of Labour Hire Employment in
Australia, Staff Working Paper (February 2005); Richard Hall, Labour Hire in Australia:
Motivation, Dynamics and Prospects, Working Paper 76, Australian Centre for
Industrial Relations Research and Training, University of Sydney (April 2002);
Australian Parliament, House of Representatives Standing Committee on Employment,
Workplace Relations and Workforce Participation, Making it Work: Inquiry into
Independent Contracting and Labour Hire Arrangements, Canberra (August 2005)
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/ewrwp/independentcontracting/report.ht
m>.

Topic 2: Australian Report

23

The question of identifying the laws which protect the rights of leased
workers can be a complicated one. The one most clearly articulated and
unambiguous legal protection which will apply to workers engaged through
labour hire arrangements is the statutory protection from being exposed to
safety hazards in the workplace (see above, question 4(a)). Each jurisdiction
in Australia has laws which impose general duties on employers, employees,
suppliers of plant and equipment and, crucially, persons who have control of
workplaces. These general duties require that measures be taken by those
persons to ensure that, so far as practicable, the workplace does not expose
workers and others to safety hazards. Because these duties are not
restricted persons engaged in an employment relationship, and come into
operation merely by a worker’s presence in a particular workplace, they are
generally not compromised by questions as to the identity of the worker’s
employer, or whether the worker is an employee or an independent
contractor.
With the exception of workplace safety laws, most other labour law
protections — whether at common law, by statute or by operation of
industrial instruments — depend upon the existence of a particular kind of
legal relationship between a worker and an enterprise engaging them.
Therefore, the task of determining such a worker’s rights is twofold: first, the
legal relationship must be ascertained, and then the legal rights associated
with that relationship must be identified.
There are no laws of general application which are addressed specifically at
workers who are hired out by an agency. If the leased employee is a direct
employee of the labour hire agency (the most common situation), then that
employee will be protected by (a) any award which binds that agency in
respect of the employees employment, (b) any collective industrial
instrument which binds that agency in respect of that employee and (c) any
contract of employment between the agency and the employee.
When labour hire workers are engaged as employees of the agencies, they
are overwhelmingly engaged on a “casual” basis, rather than on a permanent
basis.56 Casual employees are generally entitled to payment at a specified
casual rate for the hours of work performed (with a casual loading, usually
20 to 25% above the normal rate, to compensate for absence of leave
entitlements). They are not entitled to a specific amount of work, and
generally have no access to remedies for unfair dismissal.

56

Analysis performed on behalf of the Economic Development Committee of the
Parliament of Victoria suggests that around 80% of labour hire employees are casual
employees: Enquiry into Labour Hire Employment in Victoria, Final Report (June 2005) p.
17.
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The other most significant form of engagement is one where there is no
employment relationship between the worker and either the “host” employer
or the agency. Such workers are regarded as self-employed, or independent
contractors; the terms and conditions of their engagement are found
exclusively within a contract, and agreements and awards do not apply to
them. Arrangements of this kind were established and promoted in the late
1980s, before being tested in court in a series of cases in the early 1990s. In
the Odco Case (also known as the Troubleshooters Case), such arrangements
were examined and it was held found that no employment relationships
existed between the workers and either the agency or the host enterprise.57
Following that judicial endorsement, the agency further promoted its
particular form of contractual arrangements, licensing them to other firms
as “the Odco system”. Such arrangements have since spread, although they
still embrace only a small minority of labour hire workers.

(b) Regulation of the supply of workers through temporary work
agencies
There are essentially two primary forms of regulation of the supply of work
through temporary work agencies: first, there is some state legislation
requiring the licensing of such agencies; and second, there has been a
pattern of localized regulation of the use of such agencies’ services imposed
by terms of industrial instruments created through collective bargaining.
In Australian jurisdictions, employment agents are required to be licensed.58
These legislative schemes deal with such matters such as regulating the fees
that may be charged by employment agents, limiting the circumstances in
which fees might be made payable by employees for the services of the
employment agents and imposed obligations on the employment agent to
maintain records of certain kinds of transactions. These registration
schemes do no generally purport to otherwise regulate the contractual
arrangements between the “host” employers and the agency, or between the
workers and the agency.
Workers in the “host” employers’ businesses and their unions, have
themselves attempted to regulate the use of labour hire arrangements by
seeking to negotiate terms in their own collective industrial which impose
limits on the circumstances under which, and the terms and conditions
which may apply when, labour hire is engaged. For example, many of the

57

BWIU v Odco Pty Ltd (1991) 99 ALR 735.
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See for example Employment Agents Act 1976 (Western Australia); Employment Agents
Registration Act 1993 (South Australia); Private Employment Agencies Act 1983
(Queensland); Agents Act 1968 (Australian Capital Territory).
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permanent employees and their unions would seek to secure agreement
which provide that labour hire employees may only be introduced into the
business for specific purposes or for specific periods of time, or following
performance of an obligation to consult with the union and permanent
employees in a particular manner, after providing particular categories of
information or after having first attempted to secure the additional required
labour in specific other ways (such as the provision of overtime or the
rehiring of former employees). Another particularly important aspect of
provisions such as these has been the attempt to secure agreement that
provide that the workers engaged through labour hire agencies and
employed within the “host” employer should be paid such rates and enjoy
such conditions that are no less favourable than those enjoyed by the
permanent employees within the “host” business. Terms such as these are
plainly designed in an attempt to minimise any incentive that might
otherwise exist for the “host” employer to undercut the terms and conditions
provided to its permanent employees, and thereby reduce the job security of
those employees.
Although these kinds of terms are not uncommon, they have been
controversial in recent years. The controversial question has been whether
terms of this kind may lawfully be included in collective industrial
agreements certified under federal law. Industrial parties are not free to
include in registered industrial agreement any terms and conditions that
may agree to between themselves. Statute provides that the agreement must
be “about matters pertaining to” the relationship between the employer and
the employees in the business whose employment is subject to the
agreement59. The High Court of Australia has recently held that this
statutory requirement means that every single term of an agreement must
pertain to the relevant relationship before such an agreement may be
certified under the federal law.60 This decision has not, however, clarified the
situation greatly, and currently is considerable uncertainty whether certified
agreements can validly regulate the use of independent contractors, use of
labour hire agencies, or the pay and conditions of employees of labour hire
agencies.
The Federal industrial tribunal has had to grapple with a range of differently
expressed clauses presented to it by industrial parties which seek to regulate
or restrict the use of labour hire in different ways. Those decisions reveal a
tension between, on the one hand, a recognition that employees within a
“host” business have a legitimate interest in protecting their job security and
that this is a question that pertains to their relationship with their employer;
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Prior to the passage of the Work Choices Bill in November 2005, that requirement was
set out in the Workplace Relations Act 1996, s.170LI(1).
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Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd. v Australian Workers Union [2004] HCA 40
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on the other hand, the tribunal has been wary of terms that go beyond
protecting this legitimate interest and appear to pertain not the relationship
between the permanent employees and the “host” employer, but rather
pertain to the relationship between the host employer and the labour hire
agency.
There have been several recent interpretations over whether such matters
are “matters pertaining to” the relationship between the employer and
employee, as required by the legislation. In one decision an agreement which
contained detailed requirements for the use of agency workers was declared
certifiable. This agreement obliged the employer to consult over the use of
such workers and set a maximum proportion of the total workforce who
could be sourced from labour hire agencies rather than employed directly by
the employer. The clause was held to be valid because it directly affected the
job security of the employees covered by it.61 In another case, the tribunal
upheld a clause which required the employer company to ensure that any
labour hire agencies which it used would pay their employees at the same
level as the company’s own employees. This had the indirect effect of
extending pay increases under the collective agreement to the labour hire
agencies.62 However an agreement which restricts the use of independent
contractors is not valid: the distinction is whether there is an absolute
restriction on the use of “external” labour or simply a condition on the terms
under which contractors or workers are engaged.63

(c) Judicial decisions holding that there was a direct employment
relationship between a user enterprise and employees
supplied to it
This question really raises the same issues under Australian labour law as
those dealt with in question 4(c).
In most cases it will be clear, as determined by the contractual
arrangements between the worker and the agency, and between the agency
and the “host” employer, that there is no direct employment relationship
between the “host” employer and the worker. In unclear cases, however, it
may be possible for a worker to show that he or she has a direct employment
relationship with the “host” employer. One example of such a circumstance
arising is provided by the case of Damevski v Guidice (discussed above,
question 4(c)). There, a worker was asked to sign documentation with the
intended effect of terminating the employment relationship with the previous
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62

Transport Workers’ Union of Australia v Australian Air Express (2005) 57 AILR 100-381.

63

Wesfarmers Premier Coal Ltd v AFMEPKIU (no 2) [2004] FCA 1737

Topic 2: Australian Report

27

employer, and establishing a new employment relationship between the
worker and a labour hire agency. In that particular case, it was found that,
notwithstanding what was said in the signed documents, the original
employer had given the worker assurances that “nothing would change”. The
effect of these assurances was held to be that the documents purporting to
transfer the employment relationship to the labour hire agency were
ineffective, and the original employment contract with the original employer
was still on foot. On that basis, it was concluded that, when the worker was
later dismissed, he was still entitled to bring an unfair dismissal claim
against the original employer.
In some circumstances, it has been held that a lengthy period of service with
a “host” employer, in circumstances where there is little contact between the
agency and the worker, may lead to a conclusion that the “host” employer is
the true employer of the worker. This conclusion may directly contradict the
intention of the contracting parties apparent from the contract documents
created at the commencement of the arrangement. Nevertheless, it might be
concluded in some circumstances that a lengthy period of service within a
“host” employer’s business, with little or no contact or dealings between the
agency and the worker, may give the worker grounds to assert that the
original contractual arrangements had effectively been abandoned or
superceded by a new contract of employment which must be implied to exist
between the host employer and the worker. This possibility was discussed
obliquely in a decision of the South Australian Industrial Commission.64 In
practice, arguments of this kind would be generally be difficult to sustain.
As discussed above, it is possible that, in some circumstances, Australian
courts may apply the concept of joint employment which may operate where
multiple employers share or co-determine those matters governing essential
terms and conditions of employment. Until now, in situations where control
and the obligation to pay wages are separated (as is typical in labour hire
arrangements), Australian jurisprudence has rarely resorted to the doctrine
of dual or joint employment in order characterize the employment
relationship. Recently in Morgan’s case, the federal tribunal speculated that
there was no reason why Australian law could not follow American authority
and recognize the concept of “dual” or “joint” employment.65 This suggestion
has yet to be taken up in any authoritative way by courts or tribunals in
Australia. The concept of joint employment may be materially relevant where
an employee, engaged through a labour hire agency, may wish to assert
against the “host” employer some right or entitlement – particularly some
statuory right or entitlement, such as statutory protection against harsh,
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unjust or unreasonable termination – that can only be asserted as against
an employer.

6 - FRANCHISING
(a) Franchising Regulation and Practice
Australia has a high level of franchised business operations, with the
number of franchised operations reportedly three times that of the United
States on a per capita basis. Franchising took off in the 1980s and grew
dramatically in the following decade, principally in consumer goods retailing
and food outlet sectors. Franchising has become a major method of business
expansion in Australia in recent years. Most of the large and fast-growing
franchise operations are less than ten years old, and half of these are in the
retail trade sector. Franchise operations have been growing in size, with
nearly half operating more than one outlet and many now operating
internationally. Such growth naturally results in an increasing number of
people employed in franchised operations.66
Most franchising follow the “business format” model which involves the
franchisee operating a business under license from and according to the
format created by the franchisor, generally on a long-term basis of 5 to 10
years. It may include the franchisor providing or co-coordinating any or all
of: materials, product, equipment, training, intellectual property, marketing
strategies, operational standards and procedures. The relationship may give
rise to a high degree of dependency of the franchisee on the franchisor.
Under the franchise agreement, the franchisor may exert considerable
detailed control over the operation of the franchisee’s business, which may
be similar to (or even exceed) that arising under an employment contract. In
the two years from 2002 to 2004, there was a 14 percent growth in the
number of business format franchised units.
Franchising has been used as a means of business propagation rather than
employee substitution, although its widespread use in retailing and services
has no doubt affected the number of direct employees in those sectors. There
has been some use of franchising models in the supply of labour. One of the
fastest-growing franchisors in recent years is a labor-hire company. Some
companies have recently begun using franchising as a method of
outsourcing: one whitegoods manufacturer has shifted its maintenance and
repairs operation from direct employees to franchises.67
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Currently there are about 850 franchisors and 54,000 franchisees operating
in Australia under the business format model. About half of all franchisees
are small, either sole operators or partnerships, and are therefore a form of
self-employment. Nonetheless, the number of large “chain” franchisees
(operating more than one outlet) has been growing, and franchised
operations currently employ over 500,000 workers (this includes franchisor
head offices, franchisor operated outlets, and franchisee outlets). Thus
employees in franchise operations comprise 4.5 percent of the total
Australian labour force and 5 percent of all employees.68 Franchising tends
to result in a higher rate of casual employment among employees. Among
the franchisee outlets, 44 percent of employees are permanent full-time, 31
percent are permanent part-time, and 25 percent are casual. Outlets
operated directly by franchisors tend to have a higher proportion of
permanent employees.69

(b) Legal Position of a Franchisee vis-à-vis their Franchisor
The franchisor and franchisee are completely separate business entities,
operating within the framework of a franchise contract which only affects
rights and liabilities as between themselves. Generally the franchisee is
regarded as an independent entrepreneur and not as an agent of the
franchisor. However the franchise agreement itself may allow for one party
(normally the franchisor) to exercise rights of agency or subrogation. As with
all other commercial relationships, franchise operations are generally
governed by contract law as developed by the courts at common law
(including the principles devised by higher courts exercising the special
equity jurisdiction). Trade practices legislation also lays down general rules
of commercial conduct as well as specific codes of practice for franchising.
At common law Australian courts have recently developed an implied
contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing, under which both
parties are obliged to exercise the powers conferred by the agreement
reasonably and in good faith, and not capriciously or for an extraneous
purpose.70 This concept is particularly relevant to franchise arrangements
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and has been applied in such situations by first-instance courts on several
occasions.71
It is commonly accepted that franchise agreements are relational in nature:
they require ongoing commitment to the relationship by both parties, are
incomplete (since not all risks and contingencies are known or allocated),
and tend to evolve over a long time. (In these respects they resemble
employment contracts.) Despite this, however, the notion of relational
contracts has not been embraced by appellate courts, and Australian law
does not recognise a separate class of relational contracts, although the
relational features of particular arrangements have been taken into account
in judicial decision-making.72
Franchise arrangements are subject to trade practices legislation which
prohibits misleading, deceptive or unconscionable conduct in trade or
commerce. Such legislation is designed to promote honesty in business
relationships, but does not extend so far as to provide redress for unfair or
disadvantageous relationships.73
A compulsory industry code of conduct has been enacted under the trade
practices legislation for all franchising operations. Functioning as a form of
enforced self-regulation, and enforced by the main business and consumer
regulation agency, it establishes mandatory disclosure obligations and
dispute-settlement procedures.74 Employer-employee relationships are not
covered by the Code, which specifically excludes them from its definition of
franchise agreements.75 However the Code contemplates that the franchise
agreement may allow the franchisor to regulate employment relationships
between the franchisee and its own employees. The Code allows the
franchisor to impose conditions on the franchisee in relation to
“participation requirements” by employees (as well as on the franchisees
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themselves).76 This could conceivably include training and access to benefits
by employees of the franchisee.
In addition, some franchise arrangements may be subject to the “unfair
contracts” jurisdiction which operates under the industrial relations systems
of some states. These provisions allow a party who “performs work” under or
in accordance with a contract to obtain relief for the unfair consequences of
the terms of the contract or its unfairness in operation. The provisions were
originally designed to apply to situations where normal employment
regulation (through industrial awards) is circumvented by the creation of
non-employment relationships such as the sale of a business or a lease
arrangement. The legislation has also been applied to several different forms
of franchise agreements.77
The unfair contracts legislation allows for a wide range of remedies,
including orders for restitutionary payments, performance of contractual
duties and rescission of agreements. The jurisdiction has become popular
amongst plaintiff litigants in the state of New South Wales, where the unfair
contracts jurisdiction originated and is most highly developed.
The unfair work contracts provisions would apply where a franchise
agreement is used in a situation “whereby a person performs work” and the
result is “unfair, harsh or unconscionable”, or is against the public interest,
or provides less remuneration than would be received by an employee.78 The
proviso that the agreement must contemplate performance of work by a
person limits the provisions to employment-like situations rather than
purely commercial relations, such the sale or lease of a business. The
distinction is, however, not clear, and the scope of the provisions has been
narrowed recently as the result of recent appellate court. Accordingly, there
is currently considerable doubt as to which kinds of relationship are
regarded as business-like in nature and thus not susceptible to challenge
under the unfair contracts jurisdiction. This includes larger Some larger
franchise arrangements. A recent decision has established that where the
franchisee is itself a large employer, ordinary commercial law rather than the
unfair contracts provision should apply.79
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(c) Legal Position of the Franchisee’s employees
At common law the employees of a franchisee have no legal relationship with
the franchisor; their contract of employment is exclusively with the
franchisee. The franchisor is not liable for anything done by the franchisee
while acting in their capacity as an employer. Under the doctrine of privity of
contract, nor do the employees of the franchisee have standing to enforce the
terms of the franchise agreement.
There are some ways in which the franchisor could become liable to the
franchisee’s employees, but these are unlikely to arise in ordinary
employment situations. The franchisor could be held liable if they were a
party to injurious conduct affecting the franchisee’s employee, or if the
franchisee were deemed to be acting under the authority of the franchisor
according to the principles of agency. Conceivably, any action by the
franchisor which injured the employee’s ability to perform work or enjoy the
benefits of their employment contract, either directly or indirectly, would be
actionable by the employee utilising the so-called industrial torts of
interference with contractual relations, intimidation and conspiracy. These
torts have been developed primarily in the suppression of strikes and
boycotts, although they remain open to use in other situations. A
franchisor’s insistence that the franchisee dismiss or not employ a particular
person would fall into this category.
Under trade practices legislation, a franchisor would be liable if they engaged
in misleading practices towards prospective employees of a franchisee, such
as false promises of benefits or skills that would be gained during
employment with the franchisee.80 This would particularly be the case if the
franchisor acted as the agent for the franchisee in hiring workers.81
The unfair contracts legislation allows a person who works in accordance
with a contract or agreement between two other persons (a “related condition
or collateral arrangement”) to challenge the agreement as it applies to them
on fairness grounds. Hence the legislation could potentially be used by an
employee of a franchisee who experiences unfair treatment arising from the
franchise agreement between their employer and the franchisor. However the
work would need to be performed as a direct consequence of the franchise
agreement (the work-relatedness requirement).
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7 - COLLECTIVE ACTION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN A
CONTEXT OF PRODUCTIVE DECENTRALISATION
(a) Unions and Productive Decentralisation
The Australian union movement has been opposed to various forms of
productive decentralisation. Sub-contracting and outsourcing of services has
been strongly contested in a number of industries, particularly in
construction. The recent trend of outsourcing of services (eg customer
services to call centres), has been strongly criticised by unions, which have
also sought to unionise the outsourced workforces. The national peak union
body, the Australian Council of Trade Unions, has established a campaign
for decent working conditions at call centres, including a charter and code of
minimum standards, which has been endorsed by some call centre
operators.82
A number of campaigns have been directed at various forms of productive
decentralisation. Unions in the public sector have opposed outsourcing of
government services which have occurred mainly at the level of the States
since the late 1980s. The textile industry union has run a campaign which
has attempted to reduce abuse of clothing outworkers (contractors or
sometimes employees who work in their own homes), with some success in
gaining government support for a code of practice and for legislation aimed
at securing prompt payment and leave benefits for such workers.
Unions in several sectors have expressed concern at the effects of
outsourcing and contracting on occupational health and safety. In one
recent case involving the death of a worker, the union highlighted the fact
that the worker was effectively forced into becoming an independent
contractor, and that as a result safety standards had suffered. Unions have
also been concerned at the effects of outsourcing on stress levels of workers,
and on the impact of reduced services in increasing the level of "customer
rage" — violence by the public towards front-line workers.

(b) Representation at Corporate Group Level
There is no provision for representation of workers at group level, or indeed
at individual corporate level. Australia has not adopted the works council
model of worker representation, and forms of industrial democracy have
declined over the last decade after an initial burst of interest in the 1980s.

82

<http://www.actu.asn.au/public/resources/aboutcallcentral/>

34

ISLSSL Congress 2006

There is provision for worker representation on safety committees under the
occupational health and safety legislation at state level. Generally the
composition of such committees must take account of the different sections
within the firm’s workforce. While the safety committee system is focused on
direct employer entities, it does allow for representation by the employees of
a subsidiary company on the workplace safety committee of a parent
company.

(c) Trade Unions Representing Workers in Corporate Groups
Restructuring by the union movement has provided the potential for more
effective representation of workers at corporate group level. However the
development of enterprise bargaining, with its focus on the particular
workplace, has reduced wider-level bargaining and representation at either
the industry or the group level. In particular, the system of bargaining
endorsed by the Workplace Relations Act 1996 effectively discourages
bargaining at the level of the corporate group. In fact the current federal
government’s industrial relations policy, which it is pursuing through the
WorkChoices Bill, is designed to reduce the significance of unions and
collective bargaining.
During the 1980s, union structure and coverage in Australia was extensively
changed from an occupational to an industry or sectoral basis. Most of the
nation’s union members are concentrated in eight large unions, which cover
a range of related (and sometimes unrelated) industries. Coverage of
particular workers has tended to be exclusive, so that workers in a
particular industry are only eligible to join a single union.
As a result, it is now normal for corporate employers to deal with only one
union which covers all or most of their workers. It is still common, however,
for a minority of workers in a particular occupation at a workplace to be
covered by different union to the majority; for example cleaners or
electricians in a factory may be covered by a different union to the process
workers. Hence if most or all the corporations in a group are engaged in the
same type of business or are in the same industry, it is likely that their
employees will be represented by the same union, or at least two or three
unions. At an informal level, this means that representation and bargaining
may occur at a group level; however this is not reflected in the formal system
of agreement-making.
In the last decade legislative changes have resulted in Australian collective
labour law becoming principally oriented towards the enterprise level.
Bargaining at the federal level generally involves a single business or part of
a business, so that corporate group representation and involvement (at least
formally) does not arise. Although there is provision for multi-employer
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agreements, they are rare. The “single business” is defined according to the
operational structure of a specific corporate employer entity. Legislation
limits the coverage of agreements to the employees directly employed by a
particular employer. There is no provision for a single agreement to cover
employees of subsidiary or related companies.
Since the introduction of enterprise bargaining, it has been common for
unions to combine together in collective negotiations, forming a "single
bargaining unit" for the joint representation of employees in enterprise
bargaining negotiations with a single employer. However the current federal
legislation, the Workplace Relations Act 1996, does not give any preference or
priority to union agreements (a matter of criticism by the ILO’s Committee of
Experts) and only a small proportion of registered agreements involve unions
as parties or participants.
There have been several amendments to the federal legislation designed to
prevent industry-wide agreement making through "pattern bargaining"
whereby similar agreements are pursued for different workplaces by an
industry union.83 Under the WorkChoices Bill, the Australian Industrial
Relations Commission will be able to suspend or terminate a bargaining
period if pattern bargaining is taking place. The effect of this will be to make
illegal any subsequent industrial action, with employers able to either seek
orders to cease the dispute (with substantial fines for non-compliance) or to
seek damages and injunctions at common law.
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